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A review of the literature indicates that empirical researchers have difficulty translating
Freud’s theory on depression into appropriate research questions and hypotheses. In their
attempt to do so, the level of complexity in Freud’s work is often lost. As a result, what is
empirically tested is no more than a caricature of the original theory. To help researchers
avoid such problems, this study presents a conceptual analysis of Freud’s theory of depres-
sion as it is presented in Mourning and Melancholia (Freud, 1917). In analyzing Freud’s
theory on the etiology of depression, it is essential to differentiate between (1) an iden-
tification with the satisfying and frustrating aspects of the love object, (2) the inter- and
an intrapersonal loss of the love object, and (3) conscious and unconscious dynamics. A
schematic representation of the mechanism of depression is put forward and a research
design by which this schema can be empirically investigated is outlined.
Keywords: mourning and melancholia, depression, narcissistic identification, conceptual analysis
INTRODUCTION
A review of the empirical research into Freud’s theory on depres-
sion reveals two major problems. First, there is often a dramatic gap
between Freud’s theory and the hypotheses empirical researchers
develop from it. Most illustrative of this is the way in which Freud’s
theoretical ideas about the association between depression and
experiences of loss have been put to the test. In this context, Fisher
and Greenberg (1996, p.26) observe that “with minor exceptions,
researchers have chosen to define loss in terms of loss of significant
family figures (primarily parents) usually due to death.” However,
even a superficial reading of Freud’s (1917) ‘Mourning and Melan-
cholia’ would suffice to show that his notion of loss is situated at
a different level. Freud states that “In melancholia, the occasions
which give rise to the illness extend for the most part beyond
the clear case of a loss by death, and include all those situations
of being slighted, neglected, or disappointed, which can import
opposed feelings of love and hate into the relationship or reinforce
an already existing ambivalence” (Freud, 1917, p. 251). For Freud
there is no reason to believe that a loss – be it by death, divorce,
or any other reason – should necessarily lead to depression if it is
not connected to a feeling of being slighted or disappointed, and
if it does not introduce a profound ambivalence toward what is
lost. Fisher and Greenberg’s (1996, p. 29) review of the empirical
research into the association between depression and loss con-
cludes that “The symptoms of a major segment of those who
become clinically depressed have not, in any empirical fashion,
been shown to have been triggered by a loss as such.” What is
ironic about Fisher and Greenberg’s (1996) observations, how-
ever, is that they are put forward as part of an argument against
the validity of Freudian theory.
The second problem with empirical research into Freud’s the-
ory of depression is that it virtually always focuses on isolated
associations between depression and theoretically related vari-
ables, such as loss, narcissistic identification, feeling slighted, intro-
jection of aggression, ambivalence, etc. (e.g., Fisher and Greenberg,
1996, pp. 24–25). It is clear, however, that in an isolated state, these
variables are potentially related to a variety of other types of psy-
chopathology as well. For example, ambivalence can be associated
with obsessional neurosis, feeling slighted with hysteria, narcis-
sistic identification with psychosis. As we will show in this study,
Freud’s (1917) text clearly indicates that isolated expressions of
these different characteristics should not be thought of as typical
of depression; what Freud emphasizes is the occurrence of these
different characteristics in a specific constellation.
Overall, the complexity of Freud’s theory is such that empir-
ical researchers appear to have had difficulty translating it into
appropriate hypotheses and research questions. Without a thor-
ough understanding of Freud’s work, however, any hypotheses
and research questions borne out of it will be overly simplistic.
This means that testing such hypotheses will not reflect a test
of the theory he put forward. One of the biggest challenges for
psychoanalysis is reducing the gap between theory and empirical
research. Indeed, conceptual and empirical research are too often
carried out in separate spheres. Nevertheless, all research should
start from theory and hopefully return to it. Without a robust the-
oretical framework empirical research has no compass and it is not
long before one loses track of the phenomena under investigation.
In this study I present a conceptual analysis of Freud’s (1917)
Mourning and Melancholia that can serve as a starting point for
qualitative and quantitative research. In the course of my analysis,
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I draw from my own clinical practice to elaborate certain aspects
of Freud’s theory. This clinical component of my analysis mainly
consists of unsystematic observations and is introduced only as an
elaboration of certain of Freud’s ideas. The conditions in which
these observations were made are not explicitly outlined in this
paper. As discussed below, in future research, the theoretical struc-
ture put forward here should be contrasted with clinical data
gathered and analyzed in a systematic way. A research design that
would be appropriate in this regard is presented in the final part
of this study.
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF FREUD’S THEORY ON
DEPRESSION
Above we argued that Freud conceived the experience of object loss
in depression in a broader sense than the mere loss of a loved one
through death. Such an interpretation not only misunderstands
how Freud conceptualized the nature of the experience of loss, but
also erroneously implies that loss is the cause of depression. Such
causal reasoning is nowhere to be found at this stage of Freud’s
work, where the reader will find his theoretical ideas are far more
complex.
The first thing to note about Freud’s line of reasoning in
Mourning and Melancholia is that loss is first experienced at the
interpersonal level and is, in a second moment, repeated at the
intrapersonal level. The first loss is situated in relation to a loved
one. Here he states that “An object-choice, an attachment of the
libido to a particular person, had at one time existed; then, owing
to a real slight or disappointment coming from this loved person,
the object-relationship was shattered” (Freud, 1917, pp. 248–249).
This slight turns a quantum of love into hate and thus entails
ambivalence toward the loved person. As a consequence of this
conflict, the loved one is dropped. Freud does not go into further
detail about the nature of this “slight or disappointment.” How-
ever, my own clinical observations suggest that the slight is often
passive in nature. The love object failed to act when the patient was
in a situation where she/he needed help. This situation is usually
associated with a broader Oedipal constellation: in the narratives
of patients affected by severe depression, there is usually a polarized
description of the parents. One of them is described as a tyrant,
who oppressed both the other parent and the patient. The other
parent is usually described as a victim; weak and unable to defend
him/herself. The narratives of such patients also often refer to the
tyrant-parent as the one who is the cause of all suffering. In this
context, it is not infrequent that the patient gives accounts of hav-
ing been done some kind of great injustice by him/her. The other
parent – who is usually in the position of love object – is often
described as having been too weak to intervene. The therapeutic
process often reveals that at an unconscious level, this failure was
the trigger for the depression. Thus, with respect to the “slights
and disappointments” outlined in Freud’s etiology of depression,
we must distinguish between the conscious and the unconscious
level. At the conscious level, we find a certain injustice inflicted by
the tyrant-parent; at the unconscious level we find the passiveness
of the victim-parent.
As stated above, Freud did not consider such slights and dis-
appointments to be the cause of depression. The cause is rather
situated at the level of a specific way of responding to such
disappointments. After being (seriously) disappointed by the love
object, most people transfer their libidinal investment to another
person, i.e., they replace their love object with another. However,
people vulnerable to depression react in another way. They with-
draw the libido from the object to the ego and reinvest it in two
ways. On the one hand, it is used to erect a narcissistic identification
with the love object. On the other hand it is invested in sadistic
impulses operating in the super-ego which attack the identification
with the love object in the ego by means of harsh self-reproaches.
Finally, the sadism prevails and the libidinal investments of the
representations of the object in the ego are given up. This is the
second loss, the intrapersonal loss, which is a loss of libido in
the ego. Below I describe the different aspects of the process that
leads to this intrapersonal loss in more detail, starting with Freud’s
theory on the mechanism of identification.
In Freud’s view, identification always occurs in relation to a
love object. People identify with something because it offers a cer-
tain advantage in the struggle for a love object. In Lacanian terms,
we might say that people identify with something – a signifier –
because it gives them a place in the desire of a loved other. Freud
distinguishes between two types of identification. Hysterical iden-
tification – which is the most common – is an identification with
the possessor of the love object. In other words, to have success in
the competition for the desire of a loved other, one identifies with
someone who already proved to be successful. This is the basic
mechanism in hysterical epidemics. Let’s take the example of a
school where all pupils are suddenly afflicted with stomach aches.
When the first pupil falls ill, apparently due to the consumption of
contaminated food in the school restaurant, the others – without
having eaten the contaminated food – might unconsciously inter-
pret the reactions of compassion extended to the affected pupil as
a sign of love. Consequently, they begin to experience the same
symptoms. The second type of identification is more unusual and
concerns an identification with the love object itself. Freud (1921,
p.108) gives the example of a boy who is closely attached to his
mother and who, upon being sent to boarding school, starts tak-
ing care of the other children in the same way as his mother took
care of him. Thus, to deal with the loss of the love object, he
becomes the love object. According to Freud, this is what hap-
pens in depression. Upon being disappointed by a love object, the
patient identifies with it. Freud does not specify, however, with
what aspects of the love object the patient identifies. On the basis
of my clinical experience, however, I put forward the hypothesis
that it concerns an identification with the slighting, disappoint-
ing aspects of the object. I argued above that the disappointment
in depression is passive in nature: the depressed person feels dis-
tress because the love object does not take the desired action. The
depressive state – which is essentially a state of deep passivity and
refusal to react to the stimuli of life – always boils down to an
identification with the passiveness of the love object. The patient
reacts to the failure of the love object according to the “an eye for
an eye, a tooth for a tooth” principle (i.e.,“if you don’t do anything
for me, then I won’t do anything for you either”).
This sheds light on the subsequent step in Freud’s descrip-
tion of the etiology of depression. After identifying with the love
object, sadism from the super-ego is directed at the newly formed
identifications. However, this does not seem to be entirely correct:
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the sadism from the super-ego does not so much attack the new
identification with the love object, but attacks the identification
with the object that was made before the disappointment, when
the relationship was predominantly satisfying. In that period, the
patient installed narcissistic identifications with the tender, loving,
and caring aspects of the love object. This is perhaps the reason why
many depressive patients show excessively altruistic characteristics
before the depression manifests, making them over-represented in
care-giving occupations. In other words, the mental process of
the depressed individual boils down to this: “Because you disap-
pointed me by being passive in a situation in which I needed you,
I will take revenge by becoming passive as well, and I won’t love or
care for you any longer.”
Thus, what is lost at the intrapersonal level is the identifi-
cation with the positive characteristics of the love object that
was made prior to the disappointments. What is “gained” in this
process is a set of identifications with the negative aspects of the
love object. This has certain consequences. First, the depressive
person feels worthless, a failure with respect to his/her altruis-
tic ideals (stemming from the initial identification with the love
object). Consequently, the depressive person starts to reproach
himself/herself over a series of things that apply to the nega-
tive aspects of the love object. Here we are perfectly in line with
Freud’s theory again, which explicitly states that self-reproaches
are actually reproaches made toward the love object. Indeed, Freud
remarks that such reproaches always simultaneously address iden-
tifications with the love object in the ego and the love object itself.
This love object is often found to be in close proximity to the
patient and is more or less burdened by the depression of the
patient (Freud, 1917, p. 251). The destructive effect of depression
on the people surrounding the affected individual has been doc-
umented extensively in empirical research (e.g., Coyne, 1976) and
is one of the most characteristic aspects of Freud’s theory. In the
end, Freud states, depression always boils down to sadism: by being
unwell, the depressive patient attempts to torture the former love
object, punishing him/her for his/her failures.
The exact mechanism of depressive sadism is not described in
detail by Freud, but it is easy to see that it operates via the mecha-
nism of commiseration. The depressive knows that if he/she suffers,
the love object will suffer with him/her. That is why suffering
becomes an attractor. Here we can refer to the critical analysis of
Christianity that Nietzsche (1895) makes in The Antichrist. Chris-
tianity declared commiseration to be the fundamental virtue. Yet,
according to Nietzsche, it is a vice rather than a virtue because, on
the one hand, it multiplies suffering (when one person commiser-
ates with a suffering person, two people suffer) and, on the other,
because it makes suffering attractive (because it has an impact
on the other). In the final analysis, therefore, the epidemic of
depression in the Western industrialized world might be partially
a consequence of centuries of cultivating commiseration as the
highest virtue.
It’s important, however, to differentiate between an imagi-
nary and a symbolic dimension in commiseration. The symbolic
dimension is better indicated by the term compassion. Commiser-
ation then implies that one sympathizes with the imago’s of suffer-
ing by which a depressive presents himself to the world. As such, it
renders permanent those imago’s and it is therefore associated with
resistance and stagnation in the depressive state (Lacan, 1953a,b).
Compassion, however, implies a readiness to take a subject’s speech
seriously, to confirm the inevitability of suffering within the para-
meters of the subjectivity of the patient, and to recognize the sub-
jective strainedness in the discourse of the other. It’s this openness
to speech that can be expected to transform the patient’s subjec-
tive structure and depressive experiences. As such, compassion is
essential to the dénouement of the knot of depression.
Furthermore, a striking difference can be observed between
conscious and unconscious mechanisms in depression. With
respect to the slight, at the conscious level depressive complaints
address the aggressive oppression of the tyrant-parent. At the
unconscious level depressive complaints address the passiveness
of the victim-parent. A similar distinction can be observed in the
individual’s self-reproach. At the conscious level, aggression (from
the super-ego) is directed toward the passive aspects of the ego.
The content of the self-reproach always boils down to the fact that
she/he is sick and passive, unable to do anything for loved ones.
At the unconscious level, however, aggression is clearly directed
toward the positive, caring aspects of the love object. Because the
depressive feels slighted by the passiveness of the love object, she/he
refuses to offer love and care any longer. In this light, the self-
reproach that one cannot care anymore has to be qualified as false.
Thus, depression reveals the fundamental falseness of the human
ego. Or, as Lacan (1963, p. 79) puts it in the tenth seminar, it testi-
fies to the fact that the human subject is essentially an entity that
erases its own traces.
Before integrating the results of our analysis into a schema,
we will discuss one other aspect of Freud’s (1917) Mourning and
Melancholia. In this text, Freud does not specify whether the love
object he is referring to is a love object from childhood or from
the time when the patient becomes depressed. In line with the
Freud broader theoretical frame, it seems clear that he is refer-
ring to both. In childhood, the future depressive’s representation
of the love object was outlined above, i.e., at the conscious level
the love object is represented as weak but loving, while at the
unconscious level the love object is represented as disappointing
and passive. Since these representations are invested with libido,
the future depressive will love others who match these representa-
tions. This means that this set of representations – of signifiers in
Lacanian terms – will pre-program a repetition of the same disap-
pointment in later life. As soon as this becomes manifest, the whole
mechanism described above is effectuated and inevitably leads to
the depressive phenomenology. This should not imply that from
time to time this deadly repetition cannot be halted, usually in an
encounter with someone who is able to convince the depressive
person that there is another way to exist for an Other.
This was, in a nutshell, Freud’s theory on depression. Figure 1
presents the logical structure as it is presented by Freud in Mourn-
ing and Melancholia. Figure 2 presents the same logical structure
extended with the elaborations presented above.
RESEARCH DESIGNS APPROPRIATE TO TEST FREUDIAN
THEORY ON DEPRESSION
As was argued in the introduction, it is the totality of the mech-
anism presented in Figures 1 and 2 that should be tested in
empirical research, not isolated components of it. None of the
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FIGURE 1 |The intra- and interpersonal loss in the etiology of
depression according to the theory of Freud in Mourning and
Melancholia.
constituent parts can be deemed typical of depression. Hypotheses
focusing on the different constituent parts (e.g., “Depressives
systematically report feeling slighted by the passivity of their
love objects”) can be formulated, but a global assessment of the
structure described above is still needed.
The research design most appropriate for the assessment of
this clinical complexity is without a doubt the naturalistic single
case-study design. In naturalistic single case-study research the
therapeutic process is studied in detail and in such a way that it
interferes minimally with daily practice. This, of course, does not
mean that the act of investigation leaves no traces: such research is
suitable only for certain patients, where the therapist can reason-
ably believe that the research component will not interfere with
the therapeutic process. In permissible cases, therapy sessions are
recorded with the informed consent of the patient. Throughout
the treatment, psychological and biological variables are measured,
and medication use and health-care expenses are documented.
Contrary to what is often believed, recording sessions proves to
have little or no inhibiting effect on patients’ speech (Kächele et al.,
2009). Psychometric evaluations are limited to self-report ques-
tionnaires, assessing “general distress,” and the patient’s specific
symptoms. These assessments take no more than a few minutes
and are conducted after every session. Few studies on the validity
of psychometric measurements in single case-study designs have
been carried out until now. However, it can be anticipated that for
most variables included in single case-study designs, psychometric
measurements will be far more precise compared to group designs.
Important sources of measurement error, such as differential inter-
pretations of scales between subjects and spontaneous fluctuations
in the variables under investigation, are absent in single case-study
research or can be controlled for.
In addition to the therapy recordings and the self-report data,
once per month saliva samples are taken for four consecutive
days, each morning and evening. The samples are gathered by the
patient him/herself, at home,by chewing on a piece of wadding and
placing it into a small tube (a so-called salivette). In these saliva
samples, evolutions in the concentrations of hormones, such as
cortisol, testosterone, and androstenone, can be registered through
mass spectrometry. Receptor sensitivity on the genetic material in
the saliva can also be determined. Gathering saliva samples is a
non-intrusive and reliable method of investigating the biological
effects of psychotherapy. When the therapy is complete, the ther-
apy recordings are transcribed verbatim and the researcher can
carry out an analysis of the data.
The ultimate goal of the analysis is evaluate the global struc-
ture of depression. In doing so, we start from the following
assumptions: (1) That the theoretical structure specified above
determines depressive complaints; (2) That the patient will pro-
gressively become aware of this structure during the therapeutic
process and that this structure will appear more and more explicit
in his/her speech; and (3) That depressive complaints will decrease,
not at the moment the patient becomes aware of the depresso-
genic structure, but at the moment he/she distances him/herself
from it, i.e., at the moment he/she replaces identifications with the
passive/destructive aspects of the love object with identifications
with active/constructive aspects of the love object. Merely gaining
insight into this structure might well intensify the patient’s com-
plaints; in most cases, a substantial period of working-through – in
which the depressive identifications are progressively restructured
and replaced by other identifications – will be needed.
In the first step of the analysis, fragments of the clinical material
that refer to each of the separate elements of the theoretical struc-
ture (e.g., feeling slighted by a love object, ambivalence toward
love object, etc.) are marked in the transcripts of the recorded ses-
sions. As the therapeutic process progresses, we hypothesize that
the patient will progressively integrate all of the separate elements
into a comprehensive narrative surrounding his/her depression.
Therefore, qualitative assessment is used to determine whether the
integration of the separate elements happens in a theory consis-
tent or inconsistent way. To quantify this process, the Integration
Index (INTI) can be computed by simply adding all of the differ-
ent theory-congruent associations between the separate elements
within a certain range of sessions (e.g., sessions 5–10, sessions
60–65, etc.). As the depressive gains insight into the structure of
his/her depressive experiences (i.e., as the above-described struc-
ture appears in the narratives of the depressive), we suppose that
new – non-depressive – identifications will appear in the depres-
sive’s narratives. To quantify this process, the Non-Depressive
Identifications Index (NDII) can be computed by counting the
references to such identifications in the transcriptions of the ses-
sions. While we hypothesize a zero-correlation between the INTI
and depressive complaints (as measured by the self-report ques-
tionnaires and the stress hormones), we hypothesize a significantly
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FIGURE 2 |The intra- and interpersonal loss in the etiology of depression differentiating between identifications with positive and negative aspects
of the object.
negative correlation between the NDII and depressive complaints
(i.e., as the former increases, the latter will decrease). In general,
four possible observations will lead to complete or partial rejection
of the hypothesized structure: (1) The separate characteristics are
not observed in the narrative material; (2) Theory-incongruent
associations are observed between the separate characteristics;
and (3) The INTI shows a negative correlation with measures
of depressive complaints; and (4) The NDII does not show
the predicted negative associations with measures of depressive
complaints.
With respect to selecting participants for such studies, patients
for whom depression is the primary complaint are the most suit-
able. Participants can be selected according to DSM-IV criteria,
by means of the Structured Interview for DSM-IV diagnostics
(SCID-II; First et al., 1997) and the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). It is often the case that psychological
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problems are accompanied by a certain feeling of depression. In
other words, depression can manifest as a side effect of another
type of problem. While in such cases the mechanism of the depres-
sion might be similar to the one outlined above, these patients
should not be considered suitable for studies of this kind. Study-
ing subtypes of depression, such as the anaclitic and introjective
types described by Blatt (1974), is essential in understanding the
differential manifestation of depressive phenomenology in differ-
ent personality structures, but it is of secondary importance to
the investigation of the general mechanism of depression. Such
subtypes are arguably variations of the general mechanisms of
depression, effectuated by differences at the level of the broader
personality organization.
Some authors argue that in Mourning and Melancholia Freud is
referring to psychotic depression. This interpretation seems to be
based on the fact that Freud used the term melancholia rather than
depression. However, Freud’s remarks in the beginning of this text
make clear that he was referring to depression in general, and not
(only) psychotic depression. The use of the term melancholia was
widespread in German psychiatry in the nineteenth century. Fur-
thermore, in his well-known case-study of Dora, Freud makes clear
that he considered melancholia treatable by means of psychoanaly-
sis (Freud, 1905, p. 54). Bearing in mind that he did not consider
psychoanalytic treatment appropriate for psychotic disorders, it
seems highly improbable that he used the term melancholia with
reference to psychotic depression.
Apart from diagnostic specifications, there are other restric-
tions in the selection of participants for single case-study research
into depression. Not all depressive patients will be motivated to go
through such an arduous and often long-term therapeutic process.
Some patients will have a preference for another type of therapy,
some might terminate the treatment before it reaches the point
where the underlying structure is revealed. The application of
our research procedure is therefore limited to the subgroup of
patients that choose for psychoanalytic therapy. Whether this type
of therapy is more effective in reducing depressive complaints than
other types of therapy is a question that cannot be addressed in
single case-study research (see also Desmet, 2013). What can be
addressed, however, is the specific nature of the effects of psy-
choanalytic therapy and the process that leads to these effects.
There are undoubtedly many roads toward recovery from depres-
sive symptoms. The effects of the different types of therapy on
the broader personality organization – or the subjectivity of the
patient – however, might be quite different. Certain therapies,
such as behavioral therapies, aim the straightforward restoration
of the cohesion of the patient’s Ego, without making a detour to
the unconscious or non-integrated aspects of the patient’s sub-
jectivity; other therapies, such as psychoanalysis, do undertake
this detour in order to place the patient in charge of his own
life and to make him the author of his own history; still other
therapies aim at a temporarily relief from depressing drives and
ideations by means of pharmaceutical interventions to open up a
pathway out of the depressive experiences. Whether or not inter-
ventions are successful probably depends on the match between
the type of interventions and the characteristics of the patient’s
personality.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the first part of this study we presented a conceptual analysis
of Freud’s theory of depression. In doing so, we highlighted the
demonic side of depression, i.e., the sadistic drive. From a thera-
peutic perspective, it is important to situate the sadistic drive at the
appropriate level. Depression – like any other type of sadism – is
an ultimate attempt to exist for a significant other. When the sub-
ject does not exist for another through tenderness, he might do so
by inflicting pain. Through the suffering of the other, the sadist
finds confirmation that he/she exists for him/her. What is unbear-
able for the subject is the indifference of the other. In this respect,
sadism is a derivate of love. Tracing back depressive sadism to its
roots in love, reintegrating it in the subjective experience of love,
might be the ultimate therapeutic effect.
This conceptual analysis resulted in a figure representing a
schematic overview of Freud’s causal reasoning on depression. In
the second part of this study, we presented a single case research
design to put this theory to the test. In this design, we pro-
posed to start from the identification of separate characteristics
of depression in the clinical material. Subsequently, assessment
of the global structure of depression can happen through an
examination of the associations between the separate character-
istics. From conceptual, clinical, and psychometric perspectives, I
believe this research design is adequate for testing Freud’s theory
on depression. It is without any doubt that the logical structure
presented here will have to be adapted in confrontation with
empirical material. Therefore, it cannot be considered an estab-
lished body of knowledge, but only a fertile starting point for
empirical research.
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